Did you miss the Indonesian president’s November surprise?
While Australians were absorbed by the US election, the new leader of their large neighbour was busy strengthening ties with Russia and China.
On the very same day Australians watched Donald Trump reclaim the American presidency with a mix of awe and anxiety, Indonesia conducted its first-ever joint naval drills with Russia.
There can be no better illustration of the challenges facing Australian statecraft.

Trump’s election has given new meaning to “speculative analysis”, as commentators commune with his cabinet nominations to foresee the likely trajectory of US foreign policy out to 2029.
But only when the president-elect takes power and confronts events will we know how this administration will form – then execute – policy.
To our near north, however, Jakarta’s exercises with Moscow barely disturbed the Australian consciousness. While consistent with Indonesia’s long-standing ties to Russia, its policy of “non-alignment” and its desire for a “balanced” foreign policy, the timing is acute. And not only because Indonesian foreign minister Sugiono used the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia late last month to announce Indonesia’s intention to join the group as a partner country.
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It underlines that as questions mount over Washington’s capacity to maintain and lead the order it constructed after World War II, Indonesia shows again its interests with the Global South – a Global South that China’s President Xi Jinping again schmoozed at last weekend’s APEC summit in Peru.
Like Malaysia and Thailand, Indonesia clearly does not see its move towards BRICS as inconsistent with its membership of ASEAN.
It’s also not a desertion of the US. New Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s jocular congratulatory call to Trump was as notable for the reminder he gave of his training in the US as it was for his repeated addressing of the American as “sir”.
Stirring the pot
But before putting the call through to Trump, Prabowo sprung another surprise. In a joint statement with Xi in Beijing, during Prabowo’s first international visit after his inauguration, the two sides announced their commitment to joint development in areas of the South China Sea where they have competing claims.
That’s caused a stir in Jakarta, which has mostly been at pains to avoid acknowledging a territorial dispute with China.
The statement referred to the “overlapping waters claimed by the two countries”, giving the impression that Jakarta now recognises Beijing’s “nine-dash line”, which is China’s own cartographical claim to the area. Jakarta’s position has traditionally been that Indonesia has full rights over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the Natuna Islands – an area China also claims based on history.
Some in Jakarta now murmur that this is a diplomatic blunder, as Indonesia now has to sit down with China to negotiate.
“Prabowo is no novice on the geopolitical landscape, but in his foreign policy, he uses the security and defence lens, which can be very different from the lens that diplomats, and most in the foreign policy community, use,” the former editor of The Jakarta Post, Endy Bayuni, tells The Australian Financial Review.
“By agreeing to the joint development cooperation, including in the fishing sector, there is no need for the Chinese fishing boats to intrude into Indonesian waters and steal fish there. While we wait for the details of the co-operation, we can be sure there won’t be any more skirmishes. This, I assume, is Prabowo’s thinking – to avert more conflicts in the future, never mind diplomatic implications.”
Yet the Indonesian Foreign Ministry quickly issued a statement to the effect that the launching of joint development cooperation would not prejudice Jakarta’s position that the area in question is its territory – basically refuting the phrase “overlapping claims” in the Xi-Prabowo joint communiqué.
There is, then, some churn in Indonesian policy. Asked why Prabowo overturned his predecessor’s stance on BRICS – Joko Widodo’s commitment to study the invitation to join was interpreted as a polite decline – Bayuni says, “Prabowo sees Indonesia has an interest to be with the group since Indonesia shares its main agenda – to reform the global financial system and to reduce its dependence on the US dollar. Prabowo insists that joining BRICS is consistent with Indonesia’s non-alignment principle”.
Bayuni adds, “Expect more surprises from Prabowo on foreign policy. Putting Sugiono, a non-career diplomat as foreign minister, is an indication that the president has his own ideas about foreign policy – one that does not necessarily follow the long-held traditions, and one more likely aligned with Indonesia’s defence policy.”
Some Australian officials now ask whether Indonesia is in China’s pocket. But Prabowo knows that his domestic standing depends on lifting his people’s living standards. He knows China will help in that regard, much more so than the US and Australia.
So the last thing Canberra should do is rest on its laurels.
Yes, it had its own military exercises with Indonesian forces on the Sunday before the US election. And yes, it signed a defence co-operation agreement with Prabowo in August. But the prime minister’s office also thought it defensible, for the sake of the feelings of a visiting UK (and Australian) monarch, for Albanese to skip Prabowo’s inauguration and send Defence Minister Richard Marles instead.
In the diplomatic pecking order for that occasion, Australia slipped to 17th, with Marles received behind the representatives of Serbia and Vanuatu. Smiles might have been there when Albanese shook Prabowo’s hands at APEC over the weekend, but Australia needs to do a lot better.
AFR: https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/did-you-miss-the-indonesian-president-s-november-surprise-20241117-p5kr7q